STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTING THE GEOSTRATEGY OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE

Volodymyr LIPKAN
Doctor of Law, Professor
Professor, Department of Criminal Law, Process, and Forensics
Academy of Labour, Social Relations, and Tourism
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7411-2086

https://irbis-nbuv.gov.ua/ASUA/0012068

WoS : LIH-1184-2024

Cited:

Lipkan V. Strategic communications in the context of implementing the geostrategy of the Ukrainian State. Стратегічні комунікації у сфері забезпечення національної безпеки та оборони: проблеми, досвід, перспективи : V міжнар. наук.-практ. конф., 30 жовтня 2024 р.: тези доповідей / Міністерство оборони України, НУОУ. К.: НУОУ, 2024. С. 17-23 (308 с.)

The war initiated by the Russia against our state has several substantial root causes. One lies in the absence of a coherent strategic policy, a lack of a fully developed system of strategic communications, and the absence of a well-defined geostrategy for the Ukrainian State [1] (hereafter referred to as the Ukrainian State Geostrategy, or USG).

To fully capture the essence of the issue, I have structured this article into distinct, logically interconnected blocks.

1. The Geostrategic Landscape for Implementing Strategic Communications

For years, various acts of strategic lawmaking have been developed, encompassing numerous strategies, concepts, and regulatory acts. However, there has been insufficient in-depth research on their real impact on improving the daily lives of the Ukrainian nation, nor on structuring the international geostrategic landscape to benefit the realization of Ukraine’s state interests through the establishment of strategic communications (hereafter referred to as “stratcom”).

This situation stems from several factors: the “Russification” of the state apparatus [2], the promotion of a “Little Russian” mentality [3; 4], the adoption of foreign concepts and anti-Ukrainian doctrines [5], and, most importantly, the overreliance on geopolitics as a foreign theory that, both officially and academically, has denied Ukraine’s sovereignty and state identity [6].

2. On U.S. Global Strategic Leadership

I had the opportunity to study under this program in the United States at the University of Delaware. Notably, paradigmatic geostrategic views expressed by H. Kissinger, who was openly opposed to Ukraine, continue to significantly influence U.S. policy even today. Kissinger argued that Russia, in its existing configuration, was necessary to the U.S. as a potential ally against China.

Locked in the metaphysical ideas of H. Kissinger (who had close ties with D. Rothschild), Zbigniew Brzezinski [7], and repeating the mistakes of George H.W. Bush (the infamous “Chicken Kyiv” speech), as well as the strategic indecision of Barack Obama, the American school of strategy has neglected stratcom. It has failed to develop new approaches to U.S. global leadership in the face of changing conditions: conditions involving waging total war on multiple fronts, the use of low-tech weaponry, the efficient operation of large-scale weapons production, and the widespread deployment of stratcom against the U.S., including internally and in countries representing the so-called “Forces of Good.”

Currently, the U.S. continues to mistakenly regard Russia as a potential partner in countering China, a strategic error in U.S. foreign policy that reflects a flawed assessment of strategic perspectives and undervalues strategic communications as a key model for state policy in complex, non-linear global conditions [1, pp. 567-580]. From a unipolar Atlanticist perspective, the goal of delivering a strategic defeat to Russia, consistently emphasized by U.S. military officials, particularly Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, would ultimately eliminate a key instrument of influence over the primary global competitor, China.

According to Axel de Vernou, the U.S. must counter the revival of Chinese and Russian geopolitical thought by re-establishing its own American geostrategy to ensure long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests [8].

Certainly, the U.S. is our ally in the war against Russia, yet this should not prevent an objective assessment of the analytical capabilities of the U.S. and its academic institutions in creating reliable conditions for maintaining global leadership and sustaining the stability of the “Forces of Good,” of which the Ukrainian State is a part. Furthermore, I anticipate that neglecting strategic communications in domestic policy will, in the near future (forecast horizon: 2024–2028), result in destabilization of the U.S. state order, erosion of its democratic regime, and deterioration of its republican governance structure.

3. Reflection on Geostrategy within the Ukrainian Academic Community

In Ukraine, aside from my own work, only two substantial monographs on geostrategy have been prepared (O. Kondratenko [9] and A. Holtsov [10]). However, these works focus their scientific analysis primarily on Russia.

Additionally, I would like to address what can be called an “educational-scientific genocide”: due to poorly designed educational and scientific policies, there is currently no educational institution in Ukraine that prepares genuine “stratiarchs” — leaders in strategic thought, strategis architectors. Ukraine has an academic specialty, 21.03.03 — geopolitics (political science); however, as of October 2024, no specialized academic council for this discipline exists in the country. This creates an artificial barrier for defending dissertations in this field, stemming from an engineered “shortage” of specialists and, more importantly, from a perceived “lack of demand” for experts with this level of strategic thinking at the state level. A similar situation exists for specialists in strategic communications, who typically defend their dissertations in the fields of “social communications” or “public administration” [11].

I note that despite numerous conferences, discussions, events in Baltic countries, and various monographs on aspects of stratcom, we have not developed the necessary documentation to establish a new academic specialty titled “Strategic Communications.”

A sober approach is needed to assess system-building in the context of establishing strategic communications (stratcom) within the framework of the USG based on the following components:

1. Strategic — in our country, there is no model of strategic architecture that includes:
2. a) a geostrategy for the modern Ukrainian State;
3. b) sectoral strategies of state policy (strategems) as directions for political-security practices;
4. c) strategic management, incorporating mechanisms of strategic planning, forecasting, foresight, and strategic communications grounded in strategic culture;
5. d) the combination of strategic management and sectoral strategies to create the necessary and sufficient conditions for realizing national strategic values and interests, taking into account national strategic priorities;
6. e) establishment of complex regimes to ensure the stable operation of strategic infrastructure systems;
7. f) sectoral strategies as acts of strategic lawmaking, forming a legal framework for implementing these strategems.
8. Theoretical —the science of strategic communications has not yet developed.
9. Practical — a comprehensive system of strategic communications has not been built.
10. Security — strategic communications have not been integrated into the state’s security policy architecture.
11. Legal — strategic communications are not legitimized, as there is no systematic legal framework that defines the goals, objectives, principles, directions, and specific features of forming and implementing state policy in the realm of establishing strategic communications as a component of the Ukrainian State Geostrategy. Such a framework should also ensure the participation of Ukrainian citizens, the Ukrainian diaspora, public organizations, and other civil society institutions, along with the mandates of government bodies, local authorities, lobbying structures, and beneficiaries in this area.
12. Methodological —

1) in terms of stratcom theory, communication theory methodologies are applied, while stratcom is still mistakenly limited to:

1. a) public diplomacy;
2. b) public relations in the military sphere;
3. c) information and psychological operations (IPSO);
4. d) information and cybersecurity research;
5. e) public relations (PR) and government relations (GR);
6. f) civil-military cooperation.

This narrow focus ignores a significant array of other measures and components, which I have addressed in numerous previous publications.

2) in practical terms, the most developed outline of this system in Ukraine exists only within the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and other central executive bodies remain excluded from stratcom. Varied terminology is used to assess strategic events, a cohesive strategy for promoting national interests through narratives is lacking, unauthorized persons give interviews, the media environment is regulated by prohibitive norms, and state coercion measures are overused instead of building a constructive and proactive strategy for information and cybersecurity policy. Messaging platforms, especially Telegram, do not collectively foster a pro-Ukrainian messaging space and fail to significantly influence public awareness. Other critical areas also exist.

Therefore, we continue to encounter unusual and fundamentally flawed interpretations by certain authors, where:

• the inseparable phrase “strategic communications” is incorrectly used in the singular form as “strategic communication” [12, pp. 5-6];
• within the framework of studies on strategic communications under the auspices of the National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine, 1) H. Malyar examines issues of “qualification of aggressive warfare in criminal proceedings” [13, pp. 95-119]; 2) L. Yudko explores the “gaps” in the concept of “incitement” within national legislation [13, pp. 120-123]; 3) T. Honcharova addresses the discursive identity of football fans in the context of hybrid threats to national security [13, pp. 38-56];
• research on explicit and implicit models in gender policy is also included within the sphere of strategic communications.

This type of confusion and cognitive misinterpretation results from the lack of a well-defined theory of strategic communications that should clearly outline its subject and object, a categorical-conceptual system, methodologies, and other key components of a scientific knowledge framework.

Conclusion: A dominant number of scientific articles present a narrow and fragmented view of stratcom [14-16], which does not reflect a systemic stratcom paradigm within the context of building the USG. I propose a well-defined, theoretically grounded, and practically proven approach to the academic community: shift the paradigm from equating strategic communications with general communicative policy!

4. Proposals.

The development of the geostrategy of the Ukrainian State [1, pp. 70-80] should focus on strategic management through the large-scale implementation of strategic communications, grounded in the causes, conditions, and other determinants that influence its transparent and state-oriented formation.

Strategic communications should be considered from two perspectives: internal and external.

Internal:

• formation of a strategic meritocracy — a governance structure and an elite class of leaders aligned with state interests and equipped with strategic state-oriented thinking;
• sacralization of state power and institutional capacity;
• intellectualization of authority;
• imperative bureaucracy through strategic meritocracy, including measures to prevent lustration as a deliberate unlawful dismantling of the Ukrainian State’s administrative apparatus;
• creation of analytical communities and a media and network expertocracy based on Ukrainian statehood principles;
• eliminating the influence of oligarchy on state-building;
• minimizing the presence of criminal influence (criminocracy);
• aligning national education with state interests: adaptation and implementation mechanisms should support, rather than define, the goals of state educational policy in establishing strategic communications as a distinct and autonomous direction.

External: The post-war Ukrainian State should focus on self-directed development, systematically supporting the establishment of a “post-Russia” environment through stratcom and promoting the development of new:

• political systems;
• political institutions and their roles in the political structure of society, including legitimate revocation of their powers;
• vectors of social modernization;
• forms of government and transformations of the political-legal regime;
• political relations;
• political authority guided by a new ideology.

The content of stratcom in implementing the external component should include:

• effective support in building a strong and united Ukrainian State;
• an unqualified and immediate acceptance of Ukraine into NATO in 2024;
• strengthening the internal security of countries representing the “Forces of Rational Good,” primarily in terms of preserving the values of democratic states;
• enhancing unity within the EU and the Western world and minimizing the spread of strategic autonomy concepts, which are suggestively implemented by the “Axis of Evil” countries;
• establishing balanced and prudent migration policies to strengthen state institutions and improve the efficiency of institutional systems;
• developing a unified infrastructure strategy within the EU;
• decarbonization and elimination of dependency on energy resources from any single country (the identity of the country is irrelevant, as true freedom is represented by the absence of dependence on any third party in implementing one’s strategy), among other goals.

A sober approach is necessary not only to understand our role and purpose but also to recognize how the world perceives us. While the Ukrainian State has achieved international legal recognition, in practice, if we apply the methodology of stratcom as a new systemic theory, the stratcom paradigm in Western countries lacks clarity and strategic certainty regarding the continued existence of our state as a cohesive, highly functional entity and high-tech nation [17].

Therefore, our mission is to finally establish a system of strategic communications that affirms our own vision for our state. While receiving assistance, particularly from developed nations, we must understand that such aid should not replace our mental sovereignty or influence the formation of our strategic policies, which should be shaped independently through a systemic model of stratcom.

I will conclude with these lines from my own poem:

“One must fight for peace themselves,
Not await its blessed gift.
One must be conscious, not slaves,
For a state without stratcom cannot be built!”

References

1. Lipkan, V. A. Political Foundations of the Geostrategy of the Modern Ukrainian State. Monograph. Odesa: Helvetica Publishing House, 2024. 830 p.
2. Shcherbak, Yu. To Kill the Empire of Evil: Russia as the Eternal Enemy of Ukraine. Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2023. 296 p.
3. Malanyuk, Ye. Malorosiystvo. Kyiv: Ukrainian Priority, 2015. 48 p.
4. Ryabchuk, M. From Little Russia to Ukraine: Paradoxes of Delayed Nation-Building. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2000. 303 p.
5. Lipkan, V. A. Anti-Ukrainianism: A New Concept in Political Science. Security Sector of Ukraine: Current Issues in Science and Practice, Proceedings of the 12th International Scientific-Practical Conference (March 28, 2024, National Law University, Kharkiv). Part 1. Series “Security Sector of Ukraine.” Issue 47. Kharkiv: Madrid Press, 2024, pp. 105-115.
6. Lipkan, V. A. State Identity: Toward a New Political-Legal Concept. Problems of Realizing the Rights, Freedoms, and Legitimate Interests of Legal Entities in Ukraine, Proceedings of the 2nd All-Ukrainian Scientific-Practical Conference (October 8, 2024, Kyiv). Kyiv: KNUTD, 2024, pp. 289-295.
7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997. 256 p.
8. Axel de Vernou. “Rediscovering Geostrategy.” RealClearDefense.
9. Kondratenko, O. The Geostrategic Dimension of Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy. Monograph. Kyiv: Kyiv University, 2017. 607 p.
10. Holtsov, A. The Geopolitical Dimension of Russia’s Strategy in the Post-Soviet Space. Monograph. Kyiv: CNL, 2018. 392 p.
11. Syvak, T. V. Strategic Communications in Ukraine’s Public Administration System. Monograph. Kyiv: NADU, 2019. 338 p.
12. Romanenko, Ye. The Communicative Policy of the State: Theoretical-Methodological Analysis. Monograph. Kyiv: NADU, 2014. 400 p.
13. Strategic Communications in Hybrid Warfare: From Volunteers to Scholars. Edited by L. Kompantseva. Kyiv: NA SBU, 2021. 500 p.
14. Formation and Development of the Strategic Communications System in the Security and Defense Sector. Monograph. Kyiv: ArtEk Publishing, 2018. 271 p.
15. Pocheptsov, G. G. Strategic Communications: Strategy in Politics, Business, and Public Administration. Textbook for Students and Graduate Students. Kyiv: Alterpress, 2008. 216 p.
16. Konyk, D. Strategic Communications: A Guide for Civil Servants. Kyiv: OBNOVA COMPANY, 2016. 256 p.
17. Lipkan, V. A., Yakovets, A. V. Geostrategy of Modern China. Edited by Doctor of Law, Professor V. A. Lipkan. Kyiv: V. A. Lipkan Publishing, 2023. 384 p. https://doi.org/10.36059/978-966-97758-4-9